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Multi-follower tri-level (MFTL) decision making addresses compromises among three 
interacting decision units within a hierarchical system of which multiple followers are 
involved in two lower-level units. The leader’s decision is affected not only by reactions 
of the followers but also by various relationships among them. The uncooperative 
relationship is the most basic situation in MFTL decision cases where multiple followers 
at the same level make individual decisions without any information exchange or share 
among them. To support such a MFTL decision, this paper firstly proposes a general 
model for the decision problem and then develops an extreme-point search algorithm 
based on bi-level Kth-Best approach to solve the model. Finally, a numerical experiment 
illustrates the decision model and procedures of the extreme-point search algorithm. 
1. Introduction 
Tri-level decision making (also known as tri-level programming) can be 
considered as solving two optimization problems in sequence within a three-
level hierarchical system where the constraint region of the first is implicitly 
determined by the solution to the second that is a bi-level programming problem. 
This category of decision making often appears in many decentralized 
management problems with decision processes in a hierarchy in real world [1, 2]. 
Decision entities allocated at the three hierarchical levels are respectively termed 
as the top-level leader, the middle-level follower and the bottom-level follower. 
Their decision processes are interactive until they achieve equilibrium in the 
vertical structure. 
Tri-level decision making has been attracting increasing research on models 
[3, 4], solution concepts [3, 4], solution algorithms [3-5] and applications [6, 7]. 
However, the research has been limited to that one single decision entity is 
allocated at each level. Actually, multiple followers are often involved at the 
middle and bottom levels of a tri-level decision case called multi-follower tri-
level (MFTL) decision making [8]. In this instance, the leader’s decision is 
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affected not only by reactions of multiple followers at both lower levels but 
also by various relationships among multiple followers at the same level. Tri-
level decision making with such different relationships is needed to describe and 
solve by individual decision models and solution algorithms. However, 
investigates on hierarchical decision making with multiple followers have been 
centered on bi-level hierarchy [9-11] while nearly no research on MFTL 
decision making has been proposed except few brief programming models [8, 
12]. Therefore, the research on MFTL decision making involving models, 
solution algorithms and applications should be further explored. 
Within the framework of MFTL decision making, the uncooperative 
relationship is the most basic situation where multiple followers at the same 
level make their respective and individual decisions without any information 
exchange or share. This situation is very popular in a hierarchical organization 
involving competitive and uncooperative decision entities. Therefore, 
contributions of this paper aim to establish a general decision model and develop 
an available solution algorithm to describe and solve the uncooperative MFTL 
decision problem. More specifically, we firstly propose a linear MFTL decision 
model with the uncooperative relationship among both the middle-level 
followers and the bottom-level followers. To find a solution to the model, an 
extreme-point search algorithm based on bi-level Kth-Best approach [13] is 
developed. Finally, a numerical experiment is adopted to illustrate the MFTL 
decision model and procedures of the algorithm. 
2. An Uncooperative MFTL Decision Model 
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3. An Extreme-point Search Algorithm 
According to theoretical properties of multi-follower bi-level (MFBL) 
programming proposed by Calvete and Gale [9], we have the following theorem 
about MFTL decision making. 
Theorem 1 The uncooperative MFTL decision problem (1) is equivalent to the 
MFTL decision problem (2) involving one leader, n middle-level followers and 
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The extreme-point search algorithm 
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zzzzyyxW   and T . Set i=1 and go to Step 2. 
Step 2: Put kxx  , and adopt the bi-level Kth-Best approach [13] to solve the ith 
bi-level decision problem (2c-2f) and obtain the optimal solution )ˆ,,ˆ,ˆ( 1 iimii zzy  . 
Then go to Step 3. 


































zzzzyyx   is 
the optimal solution to the decision problems (2) and (1), and kK  . 
Step 4: Let 
kW




















































zzzz   and TWWW k \)(  . Go to Step 5. 









































 Set i=1 and go to Step 2.  
4. A Numerical Experiment 
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We adopt the extreme-point search algorithm to solve the MFTL decision 
problem and the detailed computing process is showed as Table 1. 
 
Table 1 The detailed computing process by the extreme-point search algorithm 
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{ 321 ,, sss } TWW \)( 3  
4 (0.5,1,1,2.5,3.5,1,2) {(0.5,1,1,2.5,3.5,1,1.5)} { 4321 ,,, ssss } TWW \)( 4  
5 (1,1,1,2,3,0.5,1.5)   { 54321 ,,,, sssss } TWW \)( 5  
6 (1,1,0.5,2,3,1,1.5)    
 
Table 1 presents the set kW of adjacent extreme points of each vertex ks
after each iteration k. T represents the set of extreme points that have been 
searched in the past iterations while W is the set of extreme points that are 
needed to verify whether the optimal solution or not in the following iterations. 












6 zzzzyyx = (1,1,0.5,2,3,1,1.5) is the optimal solution to the 
uncooperative MFTL decision problem and the objective function values of all 
decision entities are 5.0F , 5)2(1 f , 5.4
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5)3(22 f . It is noticeable that 5W  in Table 1 does not mean adjacent extreme 











5 zzzzyyx  do not exist but implies its adjacent extreme 
points have been found in previous iterations and have been involved in W. 
5. Conclusions 
In a MFTL decision problem, various relationships among multiple followers at 
the same level would generate different decision processes. To support MFTL 
decision in an uncooperative situation, this paper firstly proposes a general 
decision model in a linear version. To find an optimal solution to the model, it 
then develops an extreme-point search algorithm based on bi-level Kth-Best 
approach [13]. Finally, a numerical experiment is adopted to illustrate the model 
and algorithm, which shows that the algorithm provides an available way in 
solving the proposed uncooperative MFTL decision problem. Our further 
research is to explore other relationships, such as cooperative and reference-
uncooperative situations [8], among multiple followers and applications of 
MFTL decision making in real world. 
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